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Abstract 
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union on 4 May 2016. The GDPR replaces the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC). After a two-year transition period, the 
GDPR will be binding on all Member States including the UK, from 25 May 2018 
Needles to say, the GDRP will have a profound impact on UK data protection law. 
Subsequent to the referendum result on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU, the UK 
invoked Article 50.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and notified the EU on 
29 March 2017 of its intention to withdraw from the EU.  
Set against this background, this paper will critically examine the implications of 
Britain’s exit from the EU (hereinafter Brexit) on data protection law in the UK with a 
particular focus on the various trade models available to the UK post-Brexit, such as 
the EEA model, the Swiss model, the free trade agreement adopted by Canada and 
the WTO model. Regardless of the agreed trade model, the GDPR will continue to 
be relevant for many organisations and businesses in the UK if they wish to continue 
operating within the EU and transferring data across borders. 
This paper contends that irrespective of the model chosen for exiting the EU, the UK 
will adopt standards almost identical to the GDPR in order to remain a competitive 
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actor in the global economy. Nevertheless, even if the UK endeavours to adopt the 
same as or equivalent standards to the GDPR as a third country, this will not 
necessarily secure an adequacy decision from the European Commission potentially 
leading to burdensome requirements for UK businesses and their trading partners. 
1. Introduction 
On 23 June 2016, British citizens voted in a referendum in favour of leaving the EU 
by a slight majority of 51.9% (The Electoral Commission 2016). The UK invoked 
Article 50.2 TEU and formally notified the EU on 29 March 2017 of its intention to 
withdraw from the EU. Pursuant to Article 50.3 TEU, following this notification the UK 
has two years to negotiate a new trading relationship with the EU.1 
As stressed in the Queen’s Speech, over 70 per cent of all trade in services is 
enabled by data flows, and as a result data protection is crucial for the UK’s 
international trade (HM the Queen 2017, 47). The digital sector contributed £118 
billion to the UK economy and employed over 1.4 million people across the UK in 
2015 (HM the Queen 2017, 47). This demonstrates that without an effective data 
protection framework which allows data exchanges with the EU, the UK is likely to 
suffer significant financial losses. As held by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Lord Ashton of Hyde ‘some 
43% of EU tech companies are based in the UK and 75% of the UK’s data transfers 
are with EU member states’ (Lord Ashton of Hyde 2017, Column 129). This shows 
the importance of having a smooth data transfer between the EU and the UK. 
Accordingly, there is an increasing interest in the impact of Brexit on the GDPR and 
data protection post-Brexit in current academic literature.2 This paper seeks to 
contribute to this growing body of research by analysing the implications of Brexit on 
data protection law under different post-Brexit trade models.  
The paper is divided into six parts. Following a brief introduction, in part two, this 
paper will provide an overview of current data protection issues in the UK with 
reference to relevant case law. Subsequent to this, in part three, the paper will 
examine the UK Government’s current position in relation to data protection and 
exchange of data post-Brexit. In part four, the paper will explore various trade 
models available to the UK post-Brexit and their implications for data protection in 
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the UK. The paper will assert that the EEA model appears to be the best alternative 
for the continuity of the GDPR but it might not materialise. In part five, the paper will 
discuss the conditions for securing an adequacy decision from the Commission 
under Article 45 of the GDPR and puts forward that even if the Data Protection Bill 
becomes law by May 2018, once the UK leaves the EU and becomes a third country, 
the UK might face issues in securing an adequacy decision from the Commission 
and this would lead to some burdensome administrative formalities for UK 
businesses. Finally, in part six some tentative conclusions will be drawn as to the 
future of data protection in the UK after Brexit.  
2. Current issues in UK Data Protection 
Currently in the UK, the protection of data is regulated by the Data Protection Act 
1998 (DPA), which mirrors the 1995 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (‘EU Data 
Directive’).3 The data protection and privacy related articles of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Articles 7 and 8) and Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights are also worth mentioning as they had a significant impact on shaping 
the data protection landscape in the UK. 
In January 2012, faced with technological progress, globalisation and the 
discrepancies created by the inconsistent application of the EU Data Directive, the 
European Council recommended that a new piece of legislation, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), be introduced in order to bring uniformity to the EU 
data protection system (Woodhouse 2017). This regulation was adopted by the EC 
in April 2016 and will be formally applicable within the EU on 25 May 2018 
(EUGDPR.org). Unlike Directive 95/46/EC, the GDPR is a regulation so will be 
directly enforceable in all Member States, including the UK. 
It must be noted that lately there have been concerns as to the level of data 
protection offered in the UK. This is because there has been a tendency to pass or 
attempt to pass legislations allowing extensive data sharing and surveillance powers 
in the interest of national security and public safety (Peers 2016). Some of those 
attempts failed thanks to challenges brought by NGOs or individuals. For instance, in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson & others4 the 
compatibility of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) with 
the EU Charter was challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
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(CJEU). The case was initiated in 2014 by two UK MPs, David Davis who was 
required to drop out of the challenge and now serves as the Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union, and Tom Watson, a labour MP. The MPs challenged 
the powers to require retention of certain types of data in the now repealed DRIPA. 
The case was later joined with a Swedish case entitled Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och 
Telestyrelsen.5 In the joined cases of Tele2 Sverige and Watson, the CJEU 
concluded that general and indiscriminate data retention legislation, even when it 
serves the objective of combating crime and terrorism, is disproportionate.6  
Furthermore, in Tele2 Sverige and Watson, the Grand Chamber of CJEU ruled that 
DRIPA was incompatible with article 7 and 8 of the EU Charter as it amounted to 
extensive surveillance.7 DRIPA was repealed on 31 December 2016 and replaced by 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), which received Royal Assent on 29 
November 2016 and became an Act of Parliament (UK Parliament, 2016). The Tele2 
Sverige and Watson ruling is also problematic for the IPA as it largely replicates the 
contested provisions of DRIPA. Furthermore, arguably the IPA provides for more 
controversial data processing such as the retention of telecommunications data for 
preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder which does not comply with the 
CJEU’s finding in Tele2 and Watson (Kuşkonmaz 2017). 
The IPA was not welcomed by human rights activists, civil liberties organisations or 
privacy experts as some its provisions are at odds with the EU Charter. As Edward 
Snowden tweeted on the passing of the IPA: ‘The UK has just legalised the most 
extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy. It goes further than many 
autocracies.’ (MacAskill 2016).  
The IPA allows the interception of communications and the acquisition and retention 
of telecommunications data in the UK. The Act covers a wide variety of law 
enforcement and investigatory techniques employed by the police and the security 
and intelligence services, including the interception of communications data and 
targeted and bulk warrants. As Murray (2017, 8) puts forward, Part 4: Retention of 
Communications data which lists several purposes8 that permit data retention orders 
to be issued is arguably much wider than the now repealed DRIPA. Murray (2017,8) 
also notes that in the amended version of the Act some safeguards have been 
added to ensure that a data retention notice is granted to the Secretary of State only 
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in limited circumstances and the issuance of such notices are subject to the review 
of the Judicial Commissioners. Under section 89 (1) of the Act, the Judicial 
Commissioners are entitled to review the Secretary of State’s conclusions to assess 
whether the retention notice is necessary and proportionate for the purposes listed 
under Section 61(7) of the Act. However, the scope of the judicial review to be 
conducted by the Judicial Commissioners is rather limited as there are only three 
grounds to review these orders: illegality, fairness and irrationality, and 
proportionality (Murray 2017, 9). In other words, as put forward by Privacy 
International’s Caroline Wilson Palow and Liberty’s Director Shami Chakrabarti, such 
limited judicial review is not helpful and arguably not a sufficient safeguard against 
intrusive surveillance (HC 651 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill 
2015). Despite the fact that the Tele2 Sverige and Watson case invalidated 
provisions of the now repealed DRIPA and the case does not make any reference to 
IPA, it is evident that the above-mentioned judgment has wider repercussions. It is 
submitted that the IPA, particularly Section 89 of the Act, is at odds with the above-
mentioned judgment due to the extensive mass surveillance granted to UK 
authorities and the lack of effective safeguards within the Act that address potential 
misuse of the Act. 
It is worth noting that in 2009 the National Council for Civil Liberties reported in one 
of its opinion polls that 77 per cent of the persons polled believed that the UK had 
become a surveillance society (Liberty 2009). Lastly, in March 2015, ten human 
rights organisations, following the application of the National Council for Civil 
Liberties, joined their claim to challenge the surveillance activities of the British 
Intelligence Agencies before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).9 This 
challenge was driven by concerns that arose from the Snowden revelations. The key 
issue presented before the court was whether the ‘British surveillance of 
communications, either under its Tempora program10 or by receipt of 
communications from the US government obtained in its Prism11 or Upstream 
programs violated Articles 8 or 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(Electronic Privacy Information Centre nd.). 
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3. The Government’s current position with reference to Brexit, data protection 
and the exchange of data  
In various official publications and policy documents, the UK Government has 
continuously stated that it is fully committed to incorporating the GDPR into its data 
protection laws. 
In its Brexit White Paper dated February 2017, the UK Government affirmed that: ‘As 
we leave the EU, we will seek to maintain the stability of data transfer between EU 
Member States and the UK’ (Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt 
Hon David Davis MP 2017,45). Subsequently, in the Queen’s Speech on June 2017 
it was confirmed that the UK will introduce a new Data Protection Act which will 
incorporate the GDPR. The Data Protection Bill will eventually replace the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
In the Queen’s Speech (HM the Queen 2017, 9), it was also stated that the aim of 
the Data Protection Bill is to ensure that the UK ‘retains its world-class regime 
protecting personal data’ with a data protection framework that is suitable for the new 
digital age, and to cement the UK’s position at the forefront of technological 
innovation, international data sharing and protection of personal data. According to 
the Queen’s Speech (HM the Queen 2017, 46) the new Data Protection Bill will 
contribute to the UK being in the best position to maintain its ability to share data 
with other EU Member States and internationally after leaving the EU. The Data 
Protection Bill was introduced to the House of Lords on 13 September 2017 and the 
first reading of the Bill in the House of Commons took place on 18 January 2018.12 It 
must be noted that there might be further challenges to it before it receives Royal 
Assent and becomes law. The Bill has received positive comments as it brought 
clarity and relief to data controllers based in the UK (Kuşkonmaz 2017). 
Nevertheless, the Bill also has its critics. It is not a straightforward document to 
navigate as it constantly cross-refers to the GDPR without copying the relevant 
provisions of the GDPR and the language used is often complex and confusing 
(Hopkins 2017). 
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It is clear that the Data Protection Bill is intended to transpose the GDPR into UK law 
to ensure a smooth data transfer between the UK and the EU post-Brexit. 
Nevertheless, there is still no clarity as to whether this Bill would suffice to secure an 
adequacy decision from the EC. 
On 24 August 2017, in an official document, the UK Government finally set out its 
plans for arrangements that could ensure that personal data would continue to move 
freely between the UK and the EU (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 
Department for Exiting the European Union and the Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, 
2017). According to this document, after Brexit, the UK wants to explore a UK-EU 
model for exchanging and protecting personal data which would provide certainty for 
businesses, public authorities and individuals as well as enabling the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office and partner EU regulators to maintain effective regulatory 
cooperation (HM Government 2017, 2). This is indeed a welcome policy document 
but it is only 15 pages long and does not provide any clarity or any details as to how 
a UK-EU model for exchanging and protecting personal data will be formulated and 
negotiated. As pointed out by Antony Walker, deputy director of Tech UK, which 
represents a sizeable number of UK-based tech firms: ‘What the Government says it 
wants to achieve is positive, but we urgently need more detail on how we get there, 
because it won’t be easy or straightforward – although not impossible’ (Foster 2017). 
Furthermore, as noted by Kuşkonmaz (2017), this document does not refer to the 
discussions surrounding the IPA and other potential issues including the status of EU 
case law post-Brexit which will still be influenced by the EU Charter. 
In the light of the above, it can be said that for the time being the UK government 
appears to be committed and motivated to ensuring smooth data transfer between 
the UK and the EU and to adopting the same legal framework as the GDPR by 
introducing the new Data Protection Bill. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the 
trade models discussed below might have important repercussions on the future of 
the GDPR and data protection laws in the UK. For the time being, even if the UK 
government stays fully committed to adopting the same legal framework as the 
GDPR by adopting the Data Protection Bill, there will still be several complications 
with regard to data protection law in the UK. 
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Firstly, post-Brexit the decisions of EU institutions such as the EC and the CJEU will 
no longer be binding for the UK. This raises questions about how to resolve conflicts 
in relation to the application of the GDPR if the UK does not accept the authority of 
these institutions.  
Second, even if the UK decides to adhere fully to the provisions of the GDPR and 
remains bound by past CJEU jurisprudence, it should be taken into consideration 
that UK national courts will not be subject to or able to refer cases for clarification to 
the CJEU, which would lead to problems and uncertainties in terms of interpretation 
of EU law. 
Third, following Brexit UK judges would lose their power to override UK law that 
contravenes EU law. This was the case in Google Inc. v. Judith Vidal-Hall & others13 
where the UK Court of Appeal applied the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to 
determine that a provision of the Data Protection Act was incompatible with EU law. 
Thus, EU and UK data protection laws might each be interpreted and implemented 
differently, resulting in the creation of discrepancies between the two judicial 
systems, and this could potentially lead the UK to lose its adequate level of data 
protection. 
Finally, post-Brexit the UK would no longer be part of the European Data Protection 
Board (EDPR) and would have to accept decisions of the EDPR without 
representation, which is likely to upset those who want independence from EU 
institutions (Murray 2017, 3). 
4. Various trade models and their implications for the future of UK data 
protection 
The future and form of the data protection regime after Brexit depends on the trade 
model negotiated with the EU. This paper refers to the EEA model, the Swiss model, 
the Canadian model and trading with the EU as a WTO member. Other relevant 
models such as the Turkish Customs Union model and the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) model are not discussed in this 
paper as the effect of both of these models on data protection law and adequacy 
requirements would be very similar to the other bilateral (the Swiss and Canadian) 
models discussed in-depth below. 
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As noted by Baroness Neville Wolfe in July 2016, if the UK remains within the Single 
Market the EU rules on data might continue to apply fully in the UK. Nevertheless, if 
other trade models such as free trade agreements or the WTO model are pursued, 
the future of the GDPR and data protection law in the UK is rather uncertain as the 
UK might choose to slightly deviate from the provisions of the GDPR, which would 
require an adequacy decision from the Commission. This will be discussed below. 
4.1 The EEA model 
The UK could opt for so-called ‘Soft Brexit’ and join the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) whose current members: Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway, 
trade with the EU in the EEA.14 Data protection within the Internal Market has been 
harmonised and is part of the EEA Agreement. In other words, the above-mentioned 
countries will be complying with the GDPR by implementing it in their respective 
national system (Hasan 2016). 
The UK is currently a member of the EEA through its membership of the EU. 
However, ‘assuming the necessary agreement/approvals could be obtained (and the 
UK becomes an EFTA member as required under the EEA Agreement), the UK 
could leave the EU but join the EEA as a non-EU state member, like Norway’ 
(Garvey 2016). The process for joining could potentially be completed in under a 
year, within the two-year constraint imposed under Article 50 TEU (European Union 
Committee 2016, 20). Other members of the EFTA would have to unanimously 
agree on the UK’s membership beforehand. However, they may not be eager to do 
so (European Union Committee 2016, 20). 
Moreover, if the UK joins the EEA, or enters into an equivalent agreement, it will 
benefit from the free movement of goods, persons, capitals and services.15 Although 
the UK will benefit from the Single Market, it will be under the obligation to financially 
contribute to EU programmes it is taking part in as well as to the EU Regional 
Development Funds.16  In a research paper entitled ‘Leaving the EU’ it was put 
forward that ‘[i]f the UK left the EU and instead contributed to the EU budget on the 
same basis as Norway, its contributions would fall by around 17%’ ( Miller 2013, 22). 
However, it must not be forgotten that one of the main reasons UK citizens voted to 
leave the EU was so that the UK could recover its sovereignty. By joining the EEA, 
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the UK will lose any influence it has over the decision-making process of any of the 
legislation it will have to abide by. This would lead to a dramatic loss of sovereignty 
compared to the power it had as an EU Member State. As Theresa May stated 
during the Conservative Party conference on 2 October 2016: 
We are going to be a fully-independent, sovereign country, a country 
that is no longer part of a political union with supranational 
institutions that can override national parliaments and courts. And 
that means we are going, once more, to have the freedom to make 
our own decisions on a whole host of different matters, from how we 
label our food to the way in which we choose to control immigration. 
If the UK stays in the EEA, personal data could flow from the 27 countries and three 
EEA member states without any further safeguards and it would be required to fully 
adopt the principles in the GDPR. Furthermore, if the UK stays in the EEA, it would 
not need to secure an adequacy decision from the Commission. This undoubtedly 
constitutes the best option for the UK in terms of ensuring that data flows from the UK 
to the EU and visa versa remain unaffected. 
Nonetheless, although this model seems appropriate for data protection and privacy 
in the UK, it is unlikely to satisfy the UK in its quest for sovereignty and 
independence so does not seem very viable for the time being. Most importantly, this 
trade model will require the continued influence of the CJEU, which is at odds with 
sovereignty and independence from the CJEU. Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
nothing is set in stone and that during the negotiations with the EU the UK 
government might change direction and reconsider the EEA agreement, or an 
equivalent agreement. 
4.2 The Swiss model 
In terms of trade models, the UK could seek to replicate the Swiss model, which is 
slightly different from the EEA model. Switzerland is a member of EFTA but not the 
EEA so its access to EU markets is governed by various bilateral agreements. 
Switzerland has entered into various bilateral agreements with the EU which cover 
insurance, education, competition law, fraud prevention, free movement and the 
Schengen Agreement to name a few (Swiss Confederation Directorate for European 
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Affairs (DEA) 2017). The advantage of the Swiss model is that it will allow the UK the 
flexibility to choose the EU initiatives in which it wishes to participate and the 
freedom to opt out of other initiatives.  
Although the Swiss model seems advantageous at first glance, it has with several 
disadvantages. Firstly, Switzerland has no influence over the EU programmes it 
participates in such as Horizon 2020. More importantly, in order to secure the future 
of trade relations with the EU, Switzerland had to compromise on free movement of 
persons (Henley 2016). This makes this model unattractive for the UK, particularly 
due to concerns over immigration from the EU. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that 
the EU will provide freedom on capital, goods and services and offer a model akin to 
the Swiss model to the UK, without the UK accepting the free movement of people 
(IDS Employment Law Brief ‘Brexit’ 2016). 
It is also worth noting that the bilateral treaties between the UK and the EU would be 
subject to negotiations and a unanimous agreement from the remaining EU Member 
States. Due to Member States taking into account their own national interests, this 
could be difficult to achieve within the two-year deadline provided by Article 50 TEU 
and potentially unrealistic for this complex process. Moreover, the EU may be 
reluctant to offer a preferential trade deal to the UK so as not to open the floodgates 
to other countries wishing to leave. 
Unlike the other EEA countries, as an EFTA country Switzerland was not obligated 
to mirror the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC on data protection. Nevertheless, 
Switzerland has voluntarily mirrored the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC and 
received an adequacy decision from the Commission.17 The conditions for obtaining 
an adequacy decision will be discussed in detail under Section 5 of this article. 
As noted by McCullagh (2017,15) the degree of influence of EU data protection law 
on Switzerland will increase as of 25 May 2018 when the GDPR enters into force. 
Due to its extraterritorial application, the GDPR will apply to Swiss companies and 
organisations even if they have no presence in the EU as long as they process 
personal data of EU data subjects or monitor online behaviour of EU data subjects 
(McCullagh 2017,15). It must be noted that for the Commission not to revoke its 
adequacy decision Switzerland needed to revise the Swiss Federal Data Protection 
Act to reflect changes in the GDPR. The Swiss Federal Department of Justice and 
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Police has already revised a draft Data Protection Act in line with the GDPR. The 
new act is expected to come into effect in 2018 (Vermeil and Morscher 2017). 
In the same vein, if the UK can replicate the Swiss model, it would be expected to 
align its current data protection laws with the GDPR to secure an adequacy decision 
from the Commission. Nevertheless, it must be noted that there would always be a 
risk of the Commission revoking its adequacy decision if it decided that the data 
protection standards in the UK were not similar or equivalent to those in the GDPR. 
4.3 Free trade agreements – the Canadian model 
In their Brexit White Paper (Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt 
Hon David Davis MP 2017, Chapter 8), the UK Government expressed that it was 
not seeking membership of the Single Market but instead it wished to pursue ‘an 
ambitious comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU’. This would 
allow the UK to negotiate arrangements not only for goods but also for the free 
movement of people. 
Similar to the model adopted by Canada, the UK could negotiate a free trade 
agreement with the EU. The new ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement’ 
(CETA) between Canada and the EU is described as the ‘most ambitious trade 
agreement the EU has ever concluded’ (Glossop 2016). CETA was negotiated for 
seven years and could have taken a further two years to ratify (IDS Employment Law 
Brief ‘Brexit’ 2016). Once approved by the European Parliament, CETA will 
provisionally take effect and will enable Canada’s manufactured exports and 98% of 
its agricultural goods to be sold within the EU Internal Market without any import 
tariffs (McCullagh 2017, 17). The advantages of CETA for Canada are that it does 
not have to make any contributions to the EU budget and is not required to accept 
free movement of workers. At first glance, this seems like a very attractive model for 
the UK, given the concerns over immigration and due to the financial benefit of not 
having to contribute to the EU budget. As noted by Scarpetta (2016), CETA is the 
first third country agreement in which the EU has agreed to grant Internal Market 
access in the services sector other than to those sectors explicitly excluded. In other 
words, CETA provides access to the services sector but this access is not unlimited 
and it is not as extensive as enjoyed by UK companies at the moment.  
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Given the time it took to negotiate the CETA, it seems unfeasible for the UK and the 
EU to negotiate such a deep, bespoke agreement quickly enough. Hence, it is 
probable that the UK will encounter difficulties in coming to a desirable ‘bespoke 
agreement’ (European Union Committee 2016-2017) such as CETA.  
Given the historic and geographic ties between the UK and the EU, the EU may be 
reluctant to offer the UK access to its markets without ensuring the continued free 
movement of people. 
Canada currently has the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act that has similar provisions to the Directive 95/46/EC. In 2002, Canada secured 
an adequacy finding from the EC. It is again worth noting that this finding can be 
revoked by the EU at any time. 
Depending on the outcome of negotiations, the UK could follow the same path as 
Canada with regard to data protection by seeking an adequacy decision from the 
Commission. Nevertheless, as mentioned above in the context of Switzerland, the 
Commission could always revoke its adequacy decision if it decided that the data 
protection standards in the UK were no longer similar or equivalent to those in the 
GDPR. This would create significant uncertainty for businesses in the UK and their 
trading partners. 
4.4 Other bilateral models 
 
Other relevant models include the Turkish Customs Union model and the DCFTA 
model which supports the accession process of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
These models are not discussed in this paper as the effect on data protection law 
and adequacy requirements would be equivalent to the other bilateral (Swiss and 
Canadian) models discussed above. Both of these models would require the UK to 
change its data protection law to be in line with the GDPR (which is currently being 
done by the adoption of the Data Protection Bill) and negotiate a bespoke bilateral 
agreement for the free movement of data to enable the transfer of data between 
EU/EEA countries and the UK. 
4.5 WTO model 
Another possible outcome of negotiations for the UK is a ‘Hard Brexit’, under which 
the UK fails to reach an agreement with the EU in relation to a new trading 
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relationship and continues to trade with the Union under World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules. 
The WTO was founded in 1995 and is a global framework for trade relations 
between countries with the aim of liberalising trade by lowering tariffs and eliminating 
other barriers for improved market access (European Union Committee 2016-2017, 
51). It is founded upon ‘agreed sets of multilateral rules which govern trade between 
members’ (International Trade Committee 2016-2017, 8), including the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) (International Trade Committee 2016-2017, 8). 
If the UK relied on the WTO for its trading future, no contribution would be made to 
the EU budget and the UK would no longer be bound by the jurisdiction of the CJEU, 
thus allowing the UK to create agreements with third countries, which the current 
Government is enthusiastic to do: ‘As noted in the Brexit White Paper dated 
February 2017, following Brexit the UK will look to increase significantly trade with 
the fastest growing and most dynamic export markets in the world’ (Department for 
Exiting the European Union and The Rt Hon David Davis MP 2017, 52). Additionally, 
the UK would no longer have to accept the free movement of persons or comply with 
Single Market rules, both of which appear to have been major motivations for leaving 
the EU.  
The process would involve the amendment of the UK’s schedules with the WTO. 
This can be done by ‘rectification’ (European Union Committee 2016-2017, 53), 
referring to ‘changes or rearrangements which do not alter the scope of concessions’ 
(Rojas and Simpson 2017) or ‘modification’ (European Union Committee 2016-
2017,53), referring to ‘changes which do affect its scope’ (Miranda and Simpson, 
2017). A rectification of these schedules could be completed within ‘three months’ 
(European Union Committee 2016-2017, 53). The UK will need to ‘establish new 
schedules … providing clarity for UK businesses’ (HM Government 2017, Chapter 
9.17) and would have to strike a deal on thousands of tariff lines ‘covering its entire 
trade portfolio, to quotas on agricultural exports, subsidies to British farmers and the 
access to other markets that banks and other UK services companies now enjoy’ 
(Wang, 2017). However, under the rules of the WTO, ‘neither the UK nor the EU 
could offer each other better market access than that offered to all other WTO 
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members’ (IDS Employment Law Brief 2016, 13-18), meaning the UK would face the 
Common External Tariff imposed by the EU. This would pose a significant stumbling 
block to this.  
Reliance on the WTO rules for trade with not only the rest of the world but also the 
EU would lead to the most dramatic and disruptive changes to the UK. Leaving the 
EU would subject the UK to a significant number of restrictions and potentially affect 
the UK’s trading patterns and, in turn, its economy.  
As the WTO agreement does not cover privacy and data protection, the UK would 
need to acquire the ‘adequate level of data protection as in the EU and secure an 
adequacy decision.  
5. Status of data protection law in the UK post-Brexit 
As noted above, the British government has announced that post-Brexit no major 
changes will be made to data protection law in the UK and the new Data Protection 
Bill will incorporate the provisions of the GDPR. However, simply adopting the Data 
Protection Bill might not suffice to alleviate all concerns with regard to data protection 
law in the UK. 
5.1. Data protection and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
On 13 November 2017, the UK Government published the first draft of the European 
Union Withdrawal Bill and stipulated its intention not to retain the EU Charter as part 
of UK domestic law on or after exit from the EU (European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 
Article 5(4)). The EU Charter, particularly Article 8, plays a central role in EU law on 
data protection and data processing as it contains a comprehensive and free 
standing right to protection of personal data (Woodhouse and Lang 2017,14). The 
Charter gained Treaty status in 2009 and subsequent to this date many decisions 
including the above-mentioned Tele2 and Watson judgment have relied on the 
provisions of the Charter. 
Under sections 2, 3 and 4 of the European Union Withdrawal Bill, the Government 
has expressed its intention to retain a majority of EU data protection legislation and 
case law. It is also stipulated that such law might be relied upon in domestic courts 
(European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Articles 2, 3, 4). 
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Even though the UK will retain part of EU data protection law, one of the main 
concerns regarding the removal of the Charter is the ability of the UK to ensure close 
cooperation with the EU, given that the Charter appears to be a crucial instrument in 
ensuring regulatory equivalence. Further, although pre-Brexit CJEU case law will 
remain binding on the UK, the European Union Withdrawal Bill states that on or after 
exit day the UK courts and tribunals will no longer be bound by the decisions taken 
by the CJEU (European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Article 6). This is problematic as it 
means that post-Brexit there is likely to be discrepancies between judgments in the 
UK and the EU. Such discrepancies might lead to confusion and have adverse 
repercussions on the UK securing an adequacy decision. This is discussed below in 
detail. 
5.2 Securing an adequacy decision 
If the UK leaves the EEA and becomes a third country for the purpose of data 
protection, it will face the same issues as other third countries like the USA, Canada 
and Switzerland in terms of transfer of data across borders. 
According to Article 45 of the GDPR (when assessing whether a third country 
ensures an adequate level of protection with regard to transfer of data, the EC will 
consider the rule of law in force in the third country (both general and sectoral). This 
includes access of public authorities to personal data and the onward transfer of 
personal data to another third country. Furthermore, according to Article 45 of the 
GDPR, the Commission will consider whether an independent regulatory 
organisation exists in the third country and whether such an organisation is 
adequately equipped with assisting and advising data subjects in exercising their 
rights. Lastly, pursuant to Article 45(2) of the GDPR, the Commission will 
contemplate the international commitment of the third country in relation to the 
protection of personal data. An adequacy decision will be subject to periodic review, 
at least every four years, and such review shall take into consideration all the 
relevant developments in the third county in question (GDPR Article 45(3)). If, after 
review, the Commission considers that the third country no longer ensures an 
adequate level of protection, it can amend, suspend or even repeal the decision 
without retroactive effect (GDPR Article 45(5)). 
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In October 2015, in Schrems (Case C-362/14, 2015), the CJEU concluded that the 
EU-US Safe Harbour agreement, which is a special form of adequacy decision, was 
not valid as the USA did not meet the EU’s stringent standards for adequate data 
protection. The case was initiated by Maximilian Schrems, an Austrian activist who 
was frustrated with the lack of control over his personal data that Facebook held on 
him as Facebook Ireland was transferring his personal data to its US servers. 
Schrems initially complained to the Irish Data Protection Agency and then to the Irish 
High Court, which referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. Under the 
EU-US Safe Harbour Agreement, the US was assumed to have adequate data 
protection in place and as a result US companies such as Facebook could transfer 
data from Europe to the US. However, following Snowden’s whistleblowing and 
revelations of mass surveillance by US intelligence agencies, the adequacy of data 
protection in the US was disputed. The CJEU found that the EU-US Safe Harbour 
Agreement which permitted transfer of data between the US and Europe was invalid 
as the US did not provide adequate protection to personal data, particularly with 
regard to safeguards against mass surveillance. As a result of this decision, the EC 
had to repeal its adequacy decision and negotiations have taken place between the 
EC and the US authorities to ensure the continuity of data transfer between two 
countries. On 29 February 2016, the EC presented the draft texts for a EU and US 
Privacy Shield Agreement and following the opinion of Article 29 Working Party and 
the European Parliament resolution, the EU and US Privacy Shield Agreement was 
adopted on 12 July 201618. 
Unless an alternate or transitional agreement is agreed, if the UK leaves the EU and 
stops being part of the EEA, it needs to secure an adequacy decision from the EC as 
per Article 45 of the GDPR which affirms that the UK offers an adequate level of 
protection to personal data. The EC has so far accepted Andorra, Argentina, Canada 
(commercial organisations), the Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Switzerland, Isle of Man, 
Jersey, New Zealand and the US as countries that provide adequate data protection 
and allows data transfer to them (European Commission n.d.). Pursuant to Article 
45(2) of the GDPR, in order to assess the adequacy of the level of protection the 
Commission will take into account the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the existence of an effective and functioning independent 
data protection authority in the third country and the international commitments the 
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third country has entered into, particularly with reference to the protection of personal 
data. 
Despite the rather positive and perhaps overly-confident statements communicated 
by the UK Government in various policy documents and by MPs such as Rt Hon 
Matt Hancock,19 securing the adequacy decision might not be very straightforward. 
Arguably, the UK might have difficulties in satisfying the first limb of Article 45 2(a) of 
the GDPR, particularly in relation to respect for human rights and fundamental rights. 
As discussed above, the extensive surveillance powers in the IPA, just like its 
predecessor DIPRA, are likely to be seen as problematic. In particular, the ability of 
the intelligence agencies such as GCHQ to intercept communications data are likely 
to be seen at odds with EU case law such as the joined case of Tele2 Sverige and 
Watson. By giving weight to the existing case law and the EU Charter, the EC might 
refuse to grant an adequacy decision to the UK. Similarly, if the EC considers that 
the UK no longer ensures an adequate level of protection, it can repeal its adequacy 
decision. 
5.2 Consequences of the UK failing to secure an adequacy decision 
Needless to say, if an adequacy decision is not secured, this would lead to 
uncertainty and complexity for business and public authorities as they would not be 
able to freely transfer data from the UK to the EU and vice versa. In this regard, on 
17 January 2018, the EC published a notice to stakeholders to address the 
uncertainties in data protection issues arising from Brexit (European Commission 
2018). As the notice clarifies, if the UK and the EU cannot reach a transitional 
agreement or an adequacy decision as to the transfer of data, a controller or 
processor can still carry on transferring data from the EU to the UK or vice versa if 
they provide appropriate safeguards. These safeguards may be provided by: 
i) the use of one of three sets of standard data protection clauses issued the 
Commission, 
ii) the use of legally binding data protection rules approved by the competent data 
protection authority which apply within a corporate group,  
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iii) the use of approved codes of conduct or certification mechanisms, together with 
binding and enforceable commitments of the controller or processor in the third 
country (European Commission 2018). 
The Notice also clarifies that in the absence of an adequacy decision or of the above 
mentioned appropriate safeguards, a transfer or a set of transfers may take place 
subject to certain derogations. These derogations are narrowly defined and limited to 
where: 
i) the data subject has explicitly consented to this transfer, 
ii) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract,  
iii) the transfer is necessary for the exercise of legal claims or for reasons of 
public interest (European Commission 2018).  
The Notice clearly shows that if the UK cannot secure an adequacy decision, UK 
businesses can still operate within the EU but they would be require to review their 
existing data protection policies and contracts thoroughly in preparation for Brexit. In 
other words, in the case of the UK not securing an adequacy decision, UK 
businesses are likely to incur significant costs to ensure that they comply with the EU 
requirements. Arguably, this also leads to burdensome administrative procedures for 
UK businesses. 
6. Conclusion 
As discussed above, the best option to secure the future of the GDPR and data 
protection law in the UK would be for the UK to remain a part of the Single Market, 
fully adopting the GDPR. Regrettably, at the time of writing, in the light of the Brexit 
White Paper (Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt Hon David 
Davis MP 2017), EEA membership or other soft Brexit models such as the Swiss 
model do not seem like viable options for the UK. It is worth noting that the 
Government’s position with regard to the Single Market and EEA membership can 
still change in the course of the negotiation process. Contrary to widely shared 
views, there might still be a possibility for the UK Government to change direction 
and stay in the Single Market, fully adopting the GDPR to ensure the smooth 
exchange of data. 
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However, in the case of a hard Brexit, despite the positive and rather optimistic 
picture drawn by the UK Government, the future of the GDPR and data protection 
laws in the UK remains unclear. There are five main reasons for this.  
First, despite statements made by politicians, it is not certain that the UK government 
will continue to maintain similar standards to those in the GDPR post-Brexit, 
particularly if no trade deal has been agreed between the EU and the UK. Any 
significant deviation from the GDPR in the Data Protection Bill is likely to eliminate 
the chances of the UK securing an adequacy decision or might prompt the 
Commission to suspend or repeal its adequacy decision. 
Second, even if the UK Government adopts standards similar or equivalent to the 
GDPR, there is still no clarity as to the future of the relationship between the UK and 
the EU. As discussed above, securing an adequacy decision from the EC could be 
difficult for the UK in the light of the current case law coupled with the extensive 
surveillance laws in the UK such as the recently introduced IPA. 
Third, as the paper demonstrates, even if an adequacy decision is secured, the 
application and enforcement of the GDPR standards in the UK will be very 
complicated given that the decisions of EU institutions such as the CJEU will no 
longer be binding for the UK. As highlighted by Murray, no longer a Member of the 
EDPR and having no influence over its decisions, the UK would still need to comply 
with the decisions of the EDPR post-Brexit, which is likely to be very upsetting for 
those who want a complete separation from the EU (Murray 2017, 3). 
Fourth, as discussed above, in the absence of an adequacy decision UK businesses 
with links to the EU will need to thoroughly review their existing data protection 
policies and contracts. This would arguably be a significant administrative burden for 
UK businesses. 
Finally, even if the UK manages to secure an adequacy decision from the 
Commission, it is worth noting that the Commission can suspend or even repeal its 
decision at any time if it believes that the UK no longer ensures an adequate level of 
data protection. This uncertainty and unpredictability might push digital companies to 
move their operations outside the UK. This would indeed lead to dire consequences 
for the UK economy. 
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As the title of the paper suggests, no one can say with clarity what the future holds 
for UK data protection law in the aftermath of Brexit. The one thing that can be said 
with certainty is that the future of the GDPR and the data protection regime in the UK 
is uncertain and, in the case of a hard Brexit, it will continue to be so. 
                                                          
 
Notes 
 
1. Article 50.3. Treaty on European Union asserts: 
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless 
the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period. 
2. There are indeed several well-written articles on Brexit and data protection. For an extensive 
discussion of the status of data transfers between the EU and the UK see e.g. (Murray, 2017); (de 
Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2017); (Moerel and Tigner, 2016); (McCullagh, 2017). 
 
3. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJL 281/31. This directive has been complemented by other legal instruments such as the E-
Privacy Directive. 
 
4. Home Department v. Tom Watson & others, Case-698/15. 
 
5. See joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 21 December 2016, ECLI: EU: C: 2016:970. 
 
6. See joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 21 December 2016, ECLI: EU: C: 2016:970 para.112. 
 
7. Ibid para. 125. 
 
8. The list of permitted purposes for data retention notices are found in Section 61(7). New permitted 
purposes include; to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice, to assist in the 
identification of a person or their next of kin and functions relating to the regulation of financial 
services and markets or financial stability. 
 
9. A copy of the application of 10 NGO’s can be accessed online. Accessed January 23, 2018. 
https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/HR%20Orgs%20v%20UK.pdf.  
 
10.Tempora is a program under which the Government Communications Headquarter (GCHQ) has 
placed data interceptor on transatlantic fibre-optic cable, which allows the agency to gather 
information and intelligence in and out of the UK. 
 
11. Prism is a US programme, operated by the National Security Agency and which collects Internet 
data ranging from emails, files and photos to data from companies such as Google, Yahoo and 
Facebook. 
 
12.See stages for the Data Protection Bill  
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/dataprotection/stages.html.  
 
13.Google Inc. v. Judith Vidal-Hall & others [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
 
14.The EEA Agreement was established by a series of agreements signed in 1992. The agreement 
allows Lichtenstein, Norway and Iceland to largely participate to the EU’s Internal Market. 
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15. See EFTA, EEA Agreement (EFTA) <http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement> accessed January 
23, 2018. 
 
16. Europa, ‘European Regional Development Fund’ (Europa) Accessed January 23, 2018. 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/  
 
17. See 2000/518/EC Commission Decision of 26 July 2006 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided in 
Switzerland (notified under document number C (2000) 2304). 
 
18. See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided 
by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176) 
19.When asked for the default position if the UK does not secure an adequacy decision from the 
Commission, the Rt Hon Matt Hancock stated that: ‘We are seeking unhindered data flows, and that 
we are confident we will achieve it’. This seems like a very confident statement. See the Rt Hon Matt 
Hancock, evidence to the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee February 1, 2017 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/b3334d4c-93bf-4aca-9df5-666b7a72c06c.  
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